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Limitation Borrowing in Federal Courts 
Aggrieved citizens contemplating litigation usually face stat-
utes requiring that they bring suit within a fixed number of years 
after the claim accrues. Litigants who prosecute state claims find 
that legislatures have enacted limitations for every action by 
using provisions that restrict specific causes of action 1 and general 
statutes that limit claims not otherwise covered.2 Litigants suing 
on a federal right, however, face a different statutory scheme. 
Although federal statutes limit several specific federal causes of 
action, 3 there are no general federal statutes of limitations. As a 
result, some litigants in federal court press their claims un-
restrained by any statute of limitations. 4 
Yet such causes of action do not go unlimited. Traditionally, 
federal courts have limite,d actions by borrowing a state statute 
of limitations. Thus, when an otherwise unlimited federal claim 
arises, the court treats it as if it had arisen under state law and 
applies the appropriate state statute of limitations.5 Federal 
courts have used borrowing successfully for more than eighty 
years. Recently, however, the Supreme Court acknowledged a 
second method of limiting federal actions: in Occidental Life In-
surance Co. u. EEOC6 the Court held that when a state statute 
of limitations would "frustrate or interfere with the implementa-
tion of national policies, " 7 the right of action is to be limited by 
standards like those of the equitable doctrine of !aches. 
Occidental Life, undermining nearly a century of precedent, 
raises important questions about the appropriate method of lim-
iting actions in federal courts. 
This Note studies limitations on federal actions in light of 
Occidental Life. Part I discusses the reasons for limiting actions 
1. E.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.5801 (1970) (actions for recovery of real property); 
§ 600.5807 (1970) (breach of contract actions). 
2. E.g., MICH. COMP. LAws § 600.5813 (1970) (all other personal actions). 
3. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 15b (1976) (Clayton antitrust claims); 35 U.S.C.§ 286 (1976) 
(patent claims). 
4. Examples include causes of action alleging employment discriminations(§ 706(d) 
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1976); also 
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976)) and misrepresentation in the sale of securities (SEC rule lOb-5, 
17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1978), promulgated pursuant to§ !Ob of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1976)). 
5. See Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946); 2 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 
~ 3.07 [2] (2d ed. 1978). See also text at notes 45-49 infra. 
6. 432 U.S. 355 (1977). 
7. 432 U.S. at 367. 
1127 
1128 Michigan Law Review LVol. 77:1127 
and presents a short history ·of the limitation of actions. Part II 
analyzes the alternatives for the federal courts when no statute 
of limitations applies directly. Finally, the Note suggests a solu-
tion that will achieve a result most nearly consistent with both 
the reasons for limiting actions and the proper role of the judici-
ary. It suggests, notwithstanding Occidental Life, that in some 
situations courts should borrow specific federal statutes of limita-
tions and that in the remainder they should continue the tradi-
tional practice of borrowing state statutes of limitations. 
I. PURPOSES OF LIMITING ACTIONS 
To evaluate the alternative means of placing a time limitation 
on a cause .of action, one must understand the purposes of limit-
ing actions. This Part discusses the three most important reasons 
for governments to limit the lives of causes of action: 
(1) to promote the achievement of substantive justice by the 
courts; 
(2) to provide stability to potential defendants and to society in 
general; and 
(3) to promote the efficient use of judicial resources. 8 
The first reason to limit the life of a claim is to promote the 
achievement of substantive justice by protecting the potential 
defendants against "claims that have been allowed to slumber 
until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses 
have disappeared."9 Limiting the time period in which actions 
may be prosecuted excludes stale claims and moldy evidence and 
preserves the integrity of the fact-finding process. 
Second, limiting actions provides stability. Temporal limita-
tions, especially those of certain duration, assure potential defen-
dants that t~ey will not be forced to live indefinitely with the 
threat of a lawsuit.10 One form of limitation, the statute of limita-
tions, gives the potential defendant a precise day on which to 
heave a sigh of relief. This sigh is protected at the expense of a 
8. For discussion of the reasons for placing temporal limits on causes of action, see 
Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965); Callahan, Statutes of 
Limitation-Background, 16 Omo ST. L.J. 130 (1955); Developments in the Law-Statutes 
of Limitation, 63 HARv. L. R.Ev. 1177, 1185-86 (1950) [hereinafter cited as Developments], 
Note, An Interest Analysis Approach to the Selection of Statutes of Limitations, 49 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 299, 313-14 (1974). 
9. Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965) (quoting Order of R.R. 
Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944)). See Callahan, 
supra note 8, at 138. 
10. Adams v. Woods, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 336, 341 (1805). 
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possibly valid claim so that the sigher may plan his daily affairs 
against a stable background. This stability also benefits society 
at large. Often, many different people have a stake in the eco-
nomic status of a potential defendant. A legal action can drasti-
cally change that status and affect the well-being of the defen-
dant's associates. Therefore, many people are reluctant to deal 
with others whose legal status is uncertain. Limitation of actions 
minimizes the disruptive effects of such uncertainty on commer-
cial intercourse. 11 
Finally, limiting actions conserves judicial resources by 
checking the caseload of the courts. 12 Restricting litigation elimi-
nates claims from the trial docket, reduces crowded calendars, 
and allows courts to concentrate on relatively current disputes.13 
Despite these strong reasons for imposing time limits on the 
prosecution of claims, the common law courts did without them 
for many years. In fact, the early equity courts took the first steps 
in that direction when they began to conclusively presume pay-
ment of twenty-year old bonds and other specialties, effectively 
barring actions not prosecuted within that time. 14 Courts of law 
later followed equity's example and adopted this twenty-year 
conclusive presumption.15 
The first express statutes of limitations applied only to real-
property actions. They established temporal barriers by reference 
to certain notable events, such as royal coronations.16 Not until 
the reign of Henry VIII was the limitation period reduced to a 
fixed interval between the accrual of the right and the commence-
ment of the action.17 The English colonies in America generally 
adopted the British statute, and most kept it even after inde-
pendence.18 
Soon after the newly independent states ratified the Consti-
tution in 1787, Congress began to enact legislation for the new 
government. It created a system of federal courts19 and estab-
11. Developments, supra note 8, at 1185. 
12. Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965); Developments, supra 
note 8, at 1185; Note, supra note 8, at 302. Cf. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF 
LAWS § 142(1), Comment d (1971) (choice of law context). 
13. Ester, Borrowing Statutes of Limitation and Conflict of Laws, 15 U. FLA. L. REv. 
33, 36 (1962). But see Callahan, supra note 8, at 135. 
14. See generally 1 H. Wooo, LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS § 1 (4th ed. 1916). 
15. Id. See also Bean v. Tonnele, 94 N.Y. 381, 384 (1884). 
16. 1 H. Wooo, supra note 14, § 2. · 
17. 32 Hen.VIII, c.2 (1540). See 1 H. Wooo, supra note 14, § 2. 
18. 21 Jae. I, c. 16 (1623). See 1 H. Wooo, supra note 14, § 2 .. 
19. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789). 
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lished private federal rights.20 But all too often it failed to place 
explicit time limits on those rights. Thus, the question of whether 
limitations were intended, and, if so, how they were to be deter-
mined, was left to the courts. · 
II. ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS WHEN No FEDERAL 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS APPLIES DIRECTLY 
When no statute of limitations explicitly covers a claim in a 
federal court, the court may choose among five alternatives:21 
1) It may find that there is no limitation on the time during 
which that action may be brought. 
2) It may create its own "statute of limitations" to be ap-
plied to that claim and to all similar claims. 
3) It may "borrow" a statute of limitations from another 
federal claim and incorporate it as the relevant statute for the 
claim in question. 
4) It may "borrow" a statute of limitations from a state and 
incorporate it as the relevant statute for the claim in question. 
5) It may apply the equitable doctrine of !aches. 
This Part suggests that the first two alternatives - no limi-
t~tion and judicial legislation - are totally unacceptable. It then 
suggests that each of the last three alternatives has some merit, 
but that each poses difficult problems in some situations. The 
final Part suggests a unified theory of borrowing to resolve these 
problems. 
1. No Limit 
The first choice, to impose no temporal limits on actions, is 
unworkable. When actions go unlimited, the legal system forgoes 
the benefits of accuracy, stability, and efficiency that limitation 
is designed to foster. The gains - greater equity for those whose 
claims are valid even though old - have failed to impress Ameri-
can judges. Chief Justice Marshall, for example, said that to 
allow someone to bring an action regardless of the lapse of time 
"would be utterly repugnant to the genius of our laws. In a coun-
try where not even treason can be prosecuted, after a lapse of' 
20. E.g., Act of April 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (patents); Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 
15, 1 Stat. 124 (copyright). 
21. In addition to these limitations, a court could still invoke the twenty-year com-
mon law presumption. See text at notes 14-15 supra. See also Note, Disparities in 'l'ime 
Limitation on Federal Causes of Action, 49 YALE L.J. 738, 744 (1940). While this would 
establish a temporal barrier, few of the purposes of limiting actions would be adequately 
served by such an extended period. 
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three years, it could scarcely be supposed, that an individual 
would remain forever liable to pecuniary forfeiture." 22 Moreover, 
even though many federal actions are unlimited, Congress has 
long acquiesced in the practice of borrowing state limitations, 
suggesting a legislative preference for limited actions.23 
2. Judicially Legislated Limitations 
The second option, to allow the courts to formulate temporal 
limitations for broad classes of federal rights, would fulfill most 
purposes of limiting actions. Indeed, because courts are in a posi-
tion to see many important effects24 of any given limitation pe-
riod, they are well-placed to set specific time limits. 
The only difficulty with this approach is its concentration of 
quasi-legislative authority in the hands of the federal judiciary. 
At the heart of the problem is the distinction between legislative 
and judicial powers. Generally speaking, a court investigates, 
declares, and enforces liabilities as they stand on facts before it 
and under laws already existing.25 A legislature, on the other 
hand, provides for the future by creating, sometimes arbitrarily, 
a rule to be applied thereafter. The creation of a fixed-period 
limitation on actions, necessarily an arbitrary task, is properly 
characterized as legislative action. 
Alone, this does not preclude action by a federal court, whose 
occasional authority to act legislatively has long been recog-
nized. 26 Some of the legislative power of the federal courts is con-
stitutionally rooted;27 the remainder has been conferred on the 
courts, explicitly or implicitly, by Congress. 28 The Constitution 
22. Adams v. Woods, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 336,341 (1805). See also Campbell v. Haver-
hill, 155 U.S. 610, 616 (1895), where the Court rejected the notion of a class of plaintiffs 
whose causes of action are subject to no temporal limitations. 
23. See note 124 infra; Einhorn & Feldman, Choosing a Statute of Limitations in 
Federal Securities Actions, 25 MERCER L. REv. 497 (1974). 
24. Docket control, however, is not the only aim of statutes of limitations. See text 
at notes 8-13 supra. 
25. Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 226 (1908). 
26. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 2-2, at 16 (1978); P. BATOR, P. 
MISHKIN, P. SHAPIRO, & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER'S Tm: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
FEDERAL SYSTEM 786 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as HART & WECHSLER]. 
27. E.g., the power to create rules of decision for admiralty cases derived from U.S. 
CoNST. art. ill, § 2. See L. TRIBE, supra note 26, § 3-31 at 116; HART & WECHSLER, supra 
note 26, at 786. 
28. See L. TRIBE, supra note 26, § 3-31 at 115-16. See also Van Alstyne, The Role of 
Congress in Determining Incidental Powers of the President and of the Federal Courts: A 
Comment on the Horizontal Effect of "The Sweeping Clause", 36 QHIO ST. L.J. 788-94 
(1975). An example of such legislative power is the ability of the Supreme Court to devise 
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contains no explicit grant of power to establish limitations on the 
prosecution of actions. Thus, if the federal courts have any such 
power, it has been conferred on them by Congress. 
But Congress has never delegated this power to the courts. 
The Supreme Court implicitly recognized this in UAW v. Hoosier 
Cardinal Corp. 29 The plaintiff labor union, arguing that incom-
patible doctrines of local law must give way to principles of fed-
eral labor law30 contended that a borrowed state statute of limita-
tions should not bar its claim. Instead, the union asked the Court 
to create a uniform limitation period to close the gap left by 
Congress. Although the Court recognized that section 301 of the 
Labor Management Relations Act31 represented a broad grant to 
the courts of power to fashion labor law,32 it held that it could 
infer no congressional intent that the judiciary set a limitation 
period.33 Viewing the proposal as one for "drastic ... judicial 
legislation, 1134 the Court concluded that "the teaching of our cases 
does not require so bald a form of judicial innovation. 1135 
This is the proper view. While Congress arguably could con-
fer upon the courts a power to create fixed periods of limitation, 
there has never been any indication that it has intended to do so. 
In the absence of explicit congressional authorization, the courts 
ought not to assume that they possess such legislative power. 311 
rules of civil procedure for the federal courts pursuant to the Enabling Act, Act of June 
19, 1934, ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064. The Court has acknowledged that this power is congres-
sionally delegated. See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1941). See generally 
Weinstein, Reform of Federal Court Rulemaking Procedures, 76 CotuM. L. REV, 905 
(1976). 
29. 383 U.S. 696 (1966). 
30. Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 102 (1962). 
31. 29 u.s.c. § 185 (1976). 
32. 383 U.S. at 701. 
33. 383 U.S. at 701-04. 
34. 383 U.S. at 703. 
35. 383 U.S. at 701. But see Justice White's dissent, where he argues that the § 301 
delegation was meant to include the power to fashion limitations, 383 U.S. at 710, and 
that the Court should be free to draw on any source, including state and federal statutes, 
in devising such limitations, 383 U.S. at 714. In at least one case, the Supreme Court has 
suggested that in extraordinary circumstances, federal courts could create "statutes" of 
limitations. In Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971), the Court applied admiralty 
!aches to a personal injury suit arising from an accident on a coastal oil rig. 1rt' declining 
to create a specific· limitation period, the Court stated that "laJ special federal statute 
of limitations is created, as a matter of federal common law, only when the need for 
uniformity is particularly great or when the nature of the federal right demands a particu-
lar sort of statute of limitations." 404 U.S. at 104. See also De Malherbe v. International 
Union of Elevator Constructors, 449 F. Supp. 1335 (N.D. Cal. 1978). 
36. See also Fischbach & Moore, Inc. v. International Union of Operating Engrs,, 198 
F. Supp. 911, 915 (S.D. Cal. 1961), revd. on other grounds, 350 F.2d 936 (9th Cir. 1965), 
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3. Federal Borrowing 
A third option is to borrow an express federal statute of limi-
tations that governs a cause of action similar to that at issue. 
Although such an approach has never been used in a civil action 
at law, it has supplied the limitation in at least one maritime 
action, McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co. 37 In that case a 
seaman combined an action for unseaworthiness with a Jones 
Act38 claim for negligence. The Jones Act claim was limited by a 
three-year federal statute, 39 while the unseaworthiness action was 
not limited by any federal provision. Principles of res judicata 
prohibited the prosecution of the Jones Act claim and the unsea-
worthiness claim in separate actions. Because of this, the Court 
noted that for those wishing to press both claims, giving effect to 
the state's two-year statute for the unseaworthiness claim would 
effectively preempt the three-year Jones Act provision and the 
congressional policy expressed therein. Consequently, it held that 
the unseaworthiness claim would be limited by the three-year 
statute governing the Jones Act claim.40 
Borrowing an analogous federal limitations period is appro-
priate for some causes of action created by judicial implication.41 
In such claims, one cannot infer that congressional creation of an 
unlimited right of action reveals an intent to conform to the his-
torical practice of borrowing limitations from state laws; in these 
cases Congress has had no opportunity to consider enacting its 
own explicit limitation period. Therefore, courts should not rush 
to apply the general rule of state limitation borrowing to implied 
causes of action. 
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 904 (1966); Bayles, On Legal Reform: Legal Stability and Legisla-
tive Questions 65 KY. L.J. 631,650-1 (1977); Hill, State Procedural Law in Nondiversity 
Litigation, 69 HARV. L. REv. 66, 94 (1953); Note, Federal Statutes Without Limitations 
Provisions, 53 CoLUM. L. REv. 68, 75 (1953); Note, supra note 21, at 745. 
37. 357 U.S. 221 (1958). 
38. 46 u.s.c. § 688 (1976). 
39. The Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1976), incorporates the three-year statute of 
limitations of the Federal Employers Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 56 (1976). 
40. 357 U.S. at 225. The Court, however, did not consider whether a state period 
longer than the Jones Act period could be applied. See UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp. 
383 U.S. ·595, 704 n.6 (1966). The Court's reasoning in McAllister indicates that such a 
period could be applied since it would not frustrate the policy of the Jones Act. 
41. For example, in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 
1946), the court inferred a cause of action under SEC rule l0b-5. See also J.I. Case Co. v. 
Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (right of action under § 14a of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976) (misleading proxy solicitations)). See q.lso Friendly, In 
Praise of Erie and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. '353, 421 (1964). 
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This is particularly true when a court infers a cause of action 
from a federal statutory system that has its own specific statute 
of limitations.42 In such circumstances, the court creates a judi-
cially enforceable right because it believes that such a right is 
necessary to effectuate federal policy.43 Because the statute limit-
ing the entire scheme suggests boundaries to that policy, it is 
sensible to apply that statute to all implied offspring of that 
policy.44 
4. State Borrowing 
The fourth possibility is to borrow state statutes of limita-
tion. Unlike federal borrowing, state borrowing is well-defined by 
usage and today provides the general rule for limiting otherwise 
unlimited federal actions. The federal courts have borrowed state 
statutes since early in the nineteenth century. In M'Cluny v. 
Silliman, 45 a case grounded in diversity jurisdiction, a registrar of 
a United States land office was sued for malfeasance. Referring 
to the Rules of Decision Act, 46 the Court held the action barred 
by a six-year Ohio statute oflimita.tions: "Under this statute, the 
acts of limitations of the several states, where no special provision 
has been made by Congress, form a rule of decision in the Courts 
of the United States, and the same effect is given to them as is 
given in the state Courts."47 A borrowed state statute of limita-
tions was first used to limit a suit to enforce a / ederal right in 
1895. In Campbell v. Haverhill48 the Court applied a six-year 
Massachusetts statute to bar a patent infringement claim. Not-
ing that the Rules of Decision Act consistently had been held to 
require application of state statutes to limit state law rights as-
, 42. Causes of action under SEC rule lOb-5, for example, would meet this test since 
§ 16 of the 1934 Act contains an explicit statute of limitations. See note 73 infra. 
43. See Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946). 
44. The decision as to which federal statute of limitations to adopt might cause 
problems similar to those discussed in the text at notes 58-64 infra. Here, however, any 
confusion could be settled by the Supreme Court, whose choice of federal statutory periods 
would, as an interpretation of the underlying federal statute, be nationally applicable. 
45. 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 270 (1830). 
46. Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 92 (current version at 28 
U.S.C. § 1652 (1976)): "The laws of the several States, except where the Constitution or 
treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be 
regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases 
where they apply." The Act was amended in 1948 adding the words "civil actions" in place 
of the phrase "trials at common law." See note 55 infra. 
47. 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 277. 
48. 155 U.S. 610 (1895). 
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serted in federal court, the Court held that the Act also author-
ized state law limitation of federal causes of action. 49 Thus, when 
Congress has not spoken directly, a court is not without guidance. 
The Rules of Decision Act directs it to rely "on the State's wisdom 
in setting a limit . . . on the prosecution of a closely analogous 
claim."50 
But the literal terms of the Rules of Decision Act do not 
provide a completely satisfactory justification for limitation bor-
rowing for all federal claims. Historically, statutes of limitations 
have not applied to suits in equity, 51 and therefore the Court has 
refused to apply such state statutes to federal rights whose sole 
remedy is equitable.52 Moreover, whether the Rules of Decision 
Act itself has any relevance to equitable claims is still a topic of 
debate. By its own terms the Act applied to "trials at common 
law;"53 it said nothing about suits in equity.54 Even after congres-
sional modification of the Act in 1948 to include "civil actions" 
generally, the view that the Act should apply to equitable and 
maritime actions has received little, if any, acceptance.55 
Recently, courts have failed to state the basis of their use of 
limitation borrowing. Although they have not rejected the Rules 
of Decision Act as a justification, they have tended to ignore it 
49. 155 U.S. at 620. Two important provisos to the general rule of limitation borrow-
ing should be noted. First, federal courts need not borrow statutes that discriminate 
against or are hostile to federal rights. For example, in Rockton & Rion Ry. v. Davis, 159 
F.2d 291 (4th Cir. 1946), the court considered a South Carolina statute of limitations 
providing six years in which to bring an action of a contract, obligation, or liability unless 
such contract, obligation, or liability was created by federal statute, in which case. the 
period was one year. The court held that the one-year statute should not be applied. See 
Republic Pictures Corp. v. Kappler, 151 F.2d 543 (8th Cir. 1945), a//d.,327 U.S. 610, 615 
(1895). 
Second, the limitation period must be reasonable. Lamb v. Powder River Live Stock 
Co., 132 F. 434, 438 (8th Cir. 1904). It must afford full opportunity to sue before the bar 
takes effect. Dubuque Packing Co. v. United States, 126 F. Supp. 796, 799 (N.D. lowa), 
affd., 233 F.2d 453 (8th Cir. 1956). 
50. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 464 (1975). 
51. Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 396 (1946). See note 91 infra. 
52. Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392 (1946). See Association of Westinghouse 
Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 348 U.S. 437, 463 (1955) (Reed, J., 
concurring). This reasoning also applies to maritime rights. Finley v. United States, 244 
F.2d 125 (3d Cir. 1957). See note 90 infra. 
53. See note 46 supra. 
54. See Russell v. Todd, 309 U.S. 280 (1940). 
55. See note 46 supra. While the change would seem to require limitation borrowing 
in equitable and maritime actions, such a view has never received much support. Further-
more, by looking to congressional intent and the historic procedural autonomy of equity 
and admiralty courts, a persuasive argument can be made for maintaJning the distinction 
between legal and other actions. See Hill, supra note 36, at 113-15. 
0 
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and to treat the doctrine as an aspect of judge-made law.56 The 
Supreme Court has been indifferent toward the statute in recent 
limitation borrowing cases and has limited its discussion to un-
derlying policy values.57 
The practice of borrowing state statutes to limit federal 
causes of action poses two significant problems. The first is to 
determine which state statute of limitations ought to be borrowed 
to limit a particular federal cause of action. The second is to 
maintain uniformity among courts in different states enforcing 
the same federal right. 
The courts agree that the objective in choosing a state statute 
of limitations is to borrow the one that best effectuates the federal 
policy at issue.58 In seeking an appropriate state limitation period, 
courts follow two courses: the passive and active approaches. 
When using the passive approach, 59 the court first examines 
the nature of the federal cause of action. 60 It then examines the 
state's catalogue of limitations, determines which statute would 
apply to a similar state claim, 61 and applies that statute to the 
federal claim. This approach comports with the interpretation 
that has been given the Rules of Decision Act. 62 
A court using an active approach63 assumes a more legislative 
posture in determining which state limitation period should 
apply. The court begins, as do courts using the passive approach, 
by identifying those state statutes that govern claims similar to 
the federal claim at issue. Instead of selecting the most analogous 
statute, however, an active court establishes a group comprising 
all statutes governing state claims that bear a minimum degree 
56. E.g., Holmberg v. Armbreclit, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946): "The implied absorption 
of State statutes of limitation within the interstices of the federal enactments is a phase 
of fashioning remedial details where Congress has not spoken but left matters for judicial 
determination within the general framework offamiliar legal principles." See also Einhorn 
& Feldman, supra note 23, at 497. 
57. Note the lack of reference to the Act in recent important limitation borrowing 
cases such as Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355 (1977); Johnson v. Railway 
Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975); and UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 
696 (1966). 
58. E.g., Vanderbloom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233, 1237 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 
U.S. 852 (1970). 
59. See also text at notes 68-71 infra. 
• 60. The court determines the characteristics of, and the elements which give rise to, 
the completed cause of action. Federal law governs the characterization question. See 
Bertha Bldg. Corp. v. National Theatres Corp., 269 F.2d 785, 788 (2d Cir. 1959). 
61. Beard v. Stephens, 372 F.2d 685, 688 (5th Cir. 1967). 
62. See text at notes 5 & 48-50 supra. 
63. See also text at notes 72-74 infra. 
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of similarity to the federal claim at issue. To choose a statute 
from the group, the court weighs other factors it feels deserve 
consideration - most notably the social, economic, and political 
policies underlying the federal right, and the lengths of the peri-
ods prescribed by the various statutes - and selects the statute 
that best reflects these considerations. 64 · 
A good illustration of the difficulties that can come up under 
either the passive or the active approach to borrowing state stat-
utes of limitations is the problem of limitations for SEC rule lOb-
5 securities actions, 65 presently one of the more confused areas of 
federal law. 
A court using a passive approach often must choose among 
a large number of limitation statutes. 66 In cases arising under rule 
lOb-5, alternatives67 include state statutes of limitations govern-
ing actions for fraud, blue sky claims, 68 liability created by stat-
ute, 69 general civil causes of action (e.g., contract, personal injury, 
etc.), and claims not covered by other provisions. The court must 
select the statute that a state court would apply if the right in 
question were the creation of the state, rather than the federal 
legislature. In a lOb-5 case, it considers factors such as the pres-
ence of provisions similar to rule lOb-5 in the state blue sky law, 
parallels between lOb-5 actions and securities actions, and paral-
lels between lOb-5 actions and fraud actions.7° Courts strive to be 
64. E.g., United Cal. Bank v. Salik, 481 F.2d 1012, 1015 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 
U.S. 1004 (1973): "[T]he broad remedial policies of the federal securities laws are best 
served by a longer, not a shorter, statute of limitation." See also De Malherbe v. Interna-
tional Union of Elevator Constructors, 449 F. Supp. 1335, 1341 (N.D. Cal. 1978). 
65. "Rule lOb-5 prohibits fraud by any person who makes a material misrepresen-
tation or omission in connection with the purchase or sale of securities; rule l0b-5 thus 
extends its protection to both buyers and sellers of securities wherever the trading occurs." 
Comment, Statutes of Limitatiom in lOB-5 Actions: A Proposal for Congressional 
Legislation, 24 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1154, 1156-57 (1973) (emphasis original). 
66. See generally Bateman & Keith, Statutes of Limitations Applicable to Private 
Actions Under SEC Rule lOb-5: Complexity in Need of Reform,39 Mo. L. REv.165 (1974); 
Einhorn & Feldman, supra note 23; Schulman, Statutes of Limitation in lOb-5 Actions: 
Complications Added to Confusion, 13 WAYNE L. REV. 635 (1967); ·comment, supra note 
65; Comment, A Cry for Help: The Ninth Circuit and the Statute of Limitations in lOb-5 
Actions, 22 UCLA L. REV. 947 (1975). • 
67. See Einhorn & Feldman, supra note 23, at 499. 
68. Blue sky laws are state statutes regulating securitities. See J. MoFSKY, BLUE SKY 
RESTRICTIONS ON NEW BUSINESS PROMOTIONS 1, 3 n.1 (1971). 
69. E.g., CAL. CIV. Pao. CooE § 338 (West Supp. 1978): "An action upon a liability 
created by statute, other than a penalty or forfeiture." 
70. Einhorn & Feldman, supra note 23, at 503. The task may now be somewhat easier. 
For a while the circuits differed as to whether scienter was an element of the l0b-5 cause 
of action. In Ernst & Ernst v._ Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), the Supreme Court held 
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objective in such determinations, but because there are not, and 
never can be, clear guidelines to explain when two things are 
"similar," there is room for reasonable differences of opinion.71 
The latitude is even greater for a court that uses the active 
approach. The court begins with the same list of "similar" stat-
utes as a passive court, but the process of weighing is far more 
complicated. Similarity is only one of many criteria for selection. 
Some courts, favoring longer limitation periods, have borrowed 
general fraud statutes and applied them to lOb-5 actions.72 Others 
have relied on congressional indications that short limitation pe-
riods are most appropriate for securities actions73 to justify bor-
rowing different statutes. This discrepancy illustrates the greater 
freedom of "active" courts to pick and choose among alternatives, 
and perhaps to justify their choice by reference to their own no-
tions of what legislative intent ought to have been, as well as to 
evidence of what legislative intent actually was. It is not surpris-
ing that there is little agreement concerning the appropriate pe-
riod for lOb-5 actions.74 
As the lOb-5 cases show, the general standard of limitation 
borrowing - choosing the statute that best effectuates the federal 
policy at issue75 - has been too malleable to provide guidance. 
The Supreme C_ourt could improve the situation by specifying 
that scienter is an element of the cause of action in suits by private litigants. As a result, 
it may be more likely that courts will characterize l0b-5 actions as actions for fraud. In 
the case of rule lOb-5, the state law ultimately selected is commonly either a statute of 
limitations covering actions for fraud or one covering actions under blue sky statutes, See 
Einhorn & Feldman, supra note 23, at 500-04. See also Bateman & Keith, supra note 66, 
at 174. 
71. An additional problem exists when a state changes its statutory scheme after a 
court has determined which limitation period to borrow. Some courts have shown a reluc-
tance to change the federal limitation to bring it into line with the new state law. E.g., 
United Cal. Bank v. Salik, 481 F.2d 1012, 1014 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 414 U.S. 1004 
(1973); Douglass v. Glenn E. Hinton Univs., Inc., 440 F.2d 912,916 (9th Cir. 1971); Smith 
v. Guaranty Serv. Corp., 51 F.R.D. 289, 295 (N.D. Cal. 1970). 
72. See, e.g., United Cal. Bank v. Salik, 481 F.2d 1012, 1015 (9th Cir,), cert denied, 
414 U.S. 1004 (1973) (the court selected a three-year fraud statute, CAL, C1v. Pao. Con&§ 
338 (West Supp. 1978), over a one-year-after-discovery securities fraud (blue sky) statute, 
CAL. CokP. ConE § 25506 (West Supp. 1978)). 
73. Section 13 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1976) (relating to false 
or misleading registration statements, prospectuses, and communications), sets a limit of 
one year after discovery within a maximum of three years; and § 16 of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (1976) (relating to insider trading), sets a two• 
year limit. 
74. For a case in which the court faced several of these variables, see Bailey v, Piper, 
Jaffray & Hopwood, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 475 (D. Minn. 1976). 
· 75. See text at note 58 supra. 
April 1979] Note-Limitation Borrowing 1139 
whether courts should take an active or a passive role. The pas-
sive approach best promotes the values of stability and effi-
ciency, 76 as long as state legislatures set sensible periods for the 
prosecution of state claims.77 This approach also keeps legisla-
tively minded judges from using limitation borrowing as a mask 
for the creation of limitation periods by judicial fiat. 78 
In addition to the difficulties of selecting the correct state 
statute of limitations, some courts79 and commentators80 see a 
second problem: limitation borrowing establishes a different limi-
tation period for each state. This lack of uniformity can increase 
the profitability of forum shopping.81 Because defendants are 
often amenable to suit in more than one state, a: plaintiff whose 
delay has precluded suit in one jurisdiction may sometimes prose-
cute his action in another. 
For example, in a civil action under rule lOb-5, suit may be 
brought where any act or transaction involved in the violation 
occurred, or where the defendants reside or transact business.82 A 
plaintiff suing a national corporation could conceivably bring suit 
in any of a dozen jurisdictions and might select one to obtain a 
longer limitation period.83 A plaintiff possessing a right of action 
against two defendants may be allowed to proceed against one 
but be barred against the other solely because their home states 
provide different limitation periods. 
The problem of forum shopping, however, should not be over-
stated. Borrowing statutes, enacted by most states, limit the 
76. See text at notes 48-50 supra. 
77. See text at note 50 supra. Statutes of limitations that discriminate against federal 
rights or are manifestly unreasonable need not be borrowed,. See note 49 supra. 
78. See text at notes 25-36 supra. 
79. H.L. Green Co. v. McMahon, 312 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1962). 
80. Bateman & Keith, supra note 66, at 181; Einhorn & Feldman, supra note 23, at 
508; Comment, supra note 65, at 1161; Note, supra note 21, at 739: 
81. The problem of forum shopping results from a lack of one type of "uniformity," 
national uniformity, by which the same limitation period would govern a cause of action 
throughout the country. Limitation borrowing, however, affects at least two other types 
of "uniformity": first, consistency within the federal scheme of limitations between simi-
lar causes of action, see, e.g., text at note 73 supra; and, second, consistency within a .state 
between the limitation periods of the federal right and of similar state rights, see De 
Malherbe v. International Union of Elevator Constructors, 449 F. Supp. 1335, 1342 (N.D. 
Cal. 1978); Regan v. Sullivan, 417 F. Supp. 399, 402 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), revd. on other 
grounds, 557 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1977). 
82. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976). 
83. A plaintiff aware of a potential cause of action may wish to wait as long as possible 
to see whether the securities gain or lose, speculating at the expense of the defendant. See 
Bateman & Keith, supra note 66, at 181. 
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benefits plaintiffs can derive from forum shopping.84 A borrow-
ing statute permits a state's courts to bar an action if another 
state, often the state where the right accrued, has a statute bar-
ring that action. 85 Thus, a plaintiff who is barred in one state 
may find himself barred in all. Moreover, federal courts that 
borrow a state statute of limitations also borrow the state's bor-
rowing statute.86 Admittedly, since not all states have borrow-
ing statutes, and since those that exist may differ in terms, some 
loopholes remain. Nevertheless, these statutes close many gaps 
and limit the advantages of forum shopping. Moreover, had 
forum shopping alarmed Congress, the legislators could have 
prevented the problem by passing an explicit, uniform statute 
of limitations. This is undoubtedly why most authorities do not 
consider limitation periods characteristics of a substantive right, 
but rather procedural details governing the remedy that vindi-
cates the right. 87 
Because these two shortcomings of limitation borrowing from 
state statutes are minimal, and because the procedure fulfills 
almost all of the objectives of temporal limitation of actions, the 
courts have made it their standard rule of limitation and Con-
gress has acquiesced in that decision. Occidental Life, 88 however, 
creates an important exception to this well-established practice 
by holding that the general rule is not to be applied when the 
application of state limitations periods would "frustrate or inter-
fere with the implementation of national policies."89 The Court 
announced a new standard that is not given a formal name by the 
84. R.CRAMTON, D. CURRIE & H. KAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 190 (2d ed. 1976). See also 
Wurfel, Statutes of Limitations in the Conflict of Laws, 62 N.C. L. REv. 489, 619-33 (1974). 
85. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 142, Comment f (1971). 
86. Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461 (1947); Korn v. Merrill, 403 F. Supp. 377, 383 
(S.D.N.Y. 1976), affd., 538 F.2d 310 (2d Cir.1976); Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 
235 F. Supp. 801, 803 (D. Colo. 1964). 
87. Statutes of limitations may be characterized as either substantive or procedural. 
Generally they have been viewed as procedural, governing the remedy, not the right, and 
thus justify a forum in imposing its statute of limitations on foreign causes of action. Some 
statutes of limitations, however, have been viewed as limiting the substantive right, not 
merely the remedy. These are either contained within the statute creating the right sued 
upon or in a separate statute explicitly limiting that right. See Michigan Ins. Bank v. 
Eldred, 130 U.S. 693, 696 (1889); The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199, 214 (1886); J. ANGELL, A 
TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS AT LAW § 22 (6th ed. 1876); H. Woon, supra note 
14, § 9. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 142, 143 (1971) (conflict of 
laws rules for statutes of limitations). Borrowed statutes of limitations should not be 
considered as substantive limitations of federal rights because they are not directed at 
federal rights. 
88. 432 U.S. 355 (1977). See also text at notes 6-7 supra. 
89. 432 U.S. at 367. 
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Court but that strikingly resembles the venerable equitable doc-
trine of !aches. · 
5. Laches 
Use of the doctrine of !aches forms the last approach to limit-
ing federal actions at law;90 in light of Occidental Life, it deserves 
particular attention. In its traditional equitable form, laches 
comprises two elements: inexcusable delay by the plaintiff in 
bringing suit and prejudice to the defendant resulting from that 
delay.91 
90. See Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392 (1946); Russell v. Todd, 309 U.S. 280, 
287 (1940). The doctrine oflaches also applies in maritime actions. Czaplicki v. The Hoegh 
Silvercloud, 351 U.S. 525 (1956); The Key City, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 653, 660 (1872). See 
also Note, Laches in Federal Substantive Law: Relation to Statutes of Limitations, 56 
B.U. L. REV. 970 (1976). 
91. Gardner v. Panama R.R., 342 U.S. 29, 30 (1951); Potash Co. of America v. Inter-
national Minerals & Chem. Corp., 213 F.2d 153, 154 (10th Cir. 1954); Note, supra note 
90, at 971. Passage of time is the heart of !aches. Some courts have gone so far as to deny 
relief for reasons of delay alone, usually by presuming prejudice, acquiescence, or waiver. 
E.g., Wolstenhouse v. City of Oakland, 54 Cal. 2d 48, 51, 351 P.2d 321, 323, 4 Cal. Rptr. 
153, 155 (1960) (prejudice presumed from delay) (overruled on this point by Conti v. Board 
of Civil Serv. Commrs., 1 Cal. 3d 351, 461 P.2d 617, 82 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1969)); Monk v. 
Gillenwater, 141 W.Va. 27, 33, 87 S.E.2d 537, 541 (1955) (delay as evidence of assent, 
acquiescence, or waiver). See also W.WALSH, A TREATISE ON EQUITY§ 102, at472-73 (193Q); 
Note, 61 W.VA. L.REv. 126, 128 (1958); 6 ARK. L. REv. 60 (1951-52). And while statutes of 
limitations for actions at law are technically inapplicable to equity claims, in courts of 
concurrent legal and equitable jurisdiction "equity has usually considered the passage of 
time equivalent to the comparable statute of limitations as presumptive of !aches." 
Developments, supra note 8, at 1184. See Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461, 463 (1947); 
Bank of the United States v. Daniel, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 32, 56 (1838). See also Note, supra 
note 90, at 974-76. 
For most courts, however, mere lapse of time is insufficient to demonstrate !aches. 
They require in addition that the defendant prove some change in condition during the 
period of delay. Northern Pac. Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482, 509 (1913); Penn Mut. Life Ins. 
Co. v. Austin, 168 U.S. 685, 698 (1898); McGrann v. Allen, 291 Pa. 574, 578, 140 A. 552, 
553 (1928); H. McCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY§ 28 (2d ed. 1948); 2 
J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 419(d) (5th ed. 1941). By refusing to find !aches 
absent legally cognizable prejudice, a court may grant relief even though an extended 
period 9f time has lapsed between the accrual and the enforcement of the right of action. 
E.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483 (1919) (twenty-two years between the 
accrual of the right and the affixing of a trust status on shares of stock held by a corpora-
tion); Shaffer v. Rector Well Equip. Co., 155 F.2d 344 (5th Cir. 1946) (eight years on 
patent infringement action); Stephenson v. Stephenson, 52 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 1951) (seven 
years in suit for overdue support payments). 
In determining whether or not !aches applies, the trial judge must rely on his own 
discretion, looking to the facts and equities peculiar to the case. Gardner v. Panama R.R., 
342 U.S. 29 (1951); Potash Co. of America v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 213 
F.2d 153 (10th Cir. 1954). Cf. Gillons v. Shell Co. of Cal., 86 F.2d 600, 607 (9th Cir. 1936) 
(comparing the application of !aches to the doctrine of equitable tolling). 
Laches often provides the only limitation on an equitable remedy. In many cases, 
1142 Michigan Law Review lVol. 77:1127 
Before Occidental Life, the Supreme Court had not applied 
laches, an equitable doctrine, to federal actions at law lacking 
congressional limitations.92 In Fischbach & Moore, Inc. v. Inter-
national Union of Operating Engineers, 93 the trial court applied 
a laches test to an action for damages under section 303(b) of the 
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947.94 Relying on the "often 
expressed policy favoring a single uniform, national labor law,"95 
it refused to borrow the state limitation period.98 The Ninth Cir-
cuit, however, rejected that view, and the Supreme Court denied 
certiorari. 97 The laches approach appeared dead. -
Only twelve years later, however, the Supreme Court 
brought the doctrine back to Occidental Life. 98 It held that laches 
would supply the limitation period when borrowing a state stat-
ute would frustrate federal policy. In Occidental Life, the EEOC, 
acting pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 99 
prosecuted an individual's claim of employment discrimination, 
but the district court held the action barred by a borrowed one-
year California statute of limitations.100 More than three years of 
EEOC investigation and conciliation had passed between the 
employee's complaint and the EEOC suit. 
however, statutes establish temporal limits on equitable remedies. E.g., 43 U.S.C. § 1166 
(19761 (placing a six-year limit on suits by the United States to annul land patents); 17 
U.S.C. § 507 (1976) (placing a three-year limit on all "civil actions" for copyright infringe• 
ment). In such cases, the statute of limitations, supplementing- rather than supplanting 
- the doctrine of laches, creates a period beyond which suit will not lie, but within which 
laches may yet deny relief. See Patterson v. Hewitt, 195 U.S. 309, 318 (1904); Alsop v. 
Riker, 155 U.S. 488, 461 (1894); 2 J. POMEROY, supra, § 419(b); Hill, supra note 36, at 113; 
9 TEXAS L. REV. 93 (1930). 
92. E.g., Hellerstein v. Mather, 360 F. Supp. 473,475 (D. Colo, 1973); St. Louis-S.F. 
Ry. Co. v. Miller Floors, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 867 (D. Okla. 1968); H. McCLINTOCK, supra 
note 91, § 28 at 75: 
The majority of the courts which have considered the question, have refused to 
enjoin an action at law on the ground of the !aches of the plaintiff at law. The small 
number of cases in which an injunction was sought indicates the general opinion 
that such relief would not be granted. 
93. 198 F. Supp. 911 (S.D. Cal. 1961). 
94. Now codified at 29 U.S.C. § 181(b) (1976). 
95. 198 F. Supp. at 913. 
96. 198 F. Supp. at 915. 
97. 350 F.2d 936 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied sub. nom. C.D. Draucker, Inc. v. Inter• 
national Union of Operating Engrs., 384 U.S. 904 (1966). 
98. 432 U.S. 355 (1977). See text at notes 88-89 supra. 
99. · 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-17 (1976). 
100. The Court applied CAL. CJV. Pao. CODE § 340(3) (West Supp. 1977), a general 
statute of limitations covering, among other things, injury caused by the wrongful act of 
another. The district court's opinion is reported as EEOC v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 12 
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1298 (M.D. Cal. 1974). 
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The Supreme Court affirmed a circuit court reversal of that 
decision. The Court recognized that one goal of Title VII was to 
obtain the cooperation and voluntary compliance of employers, 
and that Congress had established an administrative procedure 
to effectuate that goal. Moreover, "[u]nlike the typical litigant 
against whom a statute of limitations might appropriately run, 
the EEOC is required by law to refrain from commencing a civil 
action until it has discharged its administrative duties. " 101 The 
Court noted that applying the borrowed one-year statute of limi-
tations would frustrate the federal policy of informally resolving 
employment discrimination claims.102 Accordingly, it specified 
that such suits would be limited by the doctrine of laches. 
It is understandable that the Court was attracted to the flexi-
bility of laches. After all, the Court itself has described the doc-
trine as the power "to locate a 'just result' in light of the circum-
stances peculiar to the case."103 But examination of the doctrine 
in light of the purposes of limiting actions reveals that laches is 
not the most desirable alternative. It is therefore regrettable that 
the Court endorsed it. 
One drawback of laches is that it fails to provide stability to 
the defendant and the society with which he interacts.104 A statute 
of limitations, in contrast, simplifies the question of diligent pros-
ecution, 105 which has been determined in actions at law solely106 
by reference to the objective statutory time pericid. 107 "If an action 
be brought the day before the statutory time expires, it will be 
sustained; if a day after, it will be defeated." 108 But under the 
doctrine of laches, the parties must wait until after the trial judge 
determines whether it would be "just" to allow the action to 
proceed. Thus laches cannot provide the predictability that is a 
101. 432 U.S. at 368. The Court also concluded that EEOC notice provisions ade-
quately protect defendants against undue hardship and surprise. 434 U.S. at 372. 
102. 432 U.S. at 368-69. 
103. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1976), quoted in 432 U.S. at 
373. This relates to the first purpose of limiting actions, providing substantive justice on 
the facts giving rise to the cause of action. See text at note 9 supra. 
104. See text at notes 10-11 supra. 
105. In one sense, statutes of limitations can be seen as liquidated !aches. See West 
v. Theis, 15 Idaho 167, 177, 96 P. 932, 935 (1908). 
106. One can argue that the doctrine of equitable tolling, discussed in note 111 infra, 
tempers a statute of limitations. Nevertheless, the statute itself still provides the means 
for objectively determining when a right of action expires. ' 
107. Prior to Occidental Life, one could always ftnd a statute of limitations, either 
congressionally enacted or, in the case of certain federal actions, borrowed from the states, 
to cover any legal action. 
108. Patterson v. Hewitt, 195 U.S. 309, 317 (1904). 
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fundamental purpose oflimitation of actions. 109 Moreover, laches 
fails to conserve judicial resources. 110 Plaintiffs who are uncertain 
as to whether their claims will be barred may be more likely to 
file suit. Furthermore, in order to decide whether laches should 
bar a claim, a court must spend additional time hearing evidence 
concerning justifiability of the delay and the existence of preju-
dice - time that would seldom be spent if an objective limitation 
were used.111 
109. See Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 435 (1965). Cf. Note, supra 
note 21, at 744 (inherently subjective nature oflaches produces a lack of uniformity among 
the courts). 
110. See text at notes 12-13 supra. 
111. This has been true in the cases following Occidental Life. One court has gone so 
far as to hold that "[w)hether the commission's delays caused prejudice that will justify 
a limitation of relief •.. can best be considered after the facts have been fully developed, 
if the commission prevails." EEOC v. American Natl. Bank, 574 F.2d 1173, 1176 (4th Cir. 
1978). This holding requires a full hearing on the merits before any question of !aches is 
reached. See also EEOC v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 577 F.2d 229, 233-34 (4th Cir. 1978). 
But see Callahan, supra note 8, at 135. 
In addition to statutes of limitations and the doctrine of !aches, the doctrine of 
equitable tolling also affects limitations of actions. Equitable tolling mitigates the arbi-
trary effects of statutes of limitations by preserving the right of action in appropriate 
cases. As announced in Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 342, 349 (1874), equitable 
tolling provides that in actions for fraud, both at law and in equity, statutes of limitations 
do not begin to run against the injured party until such time as he discovers, or in the 
exercise of due diligence ought to have discovered, the concealed fraud. See also Traer v. 
Clews, 115 U.S. 528, 537 (1885); Rosenthal v. Walker, 111 U.S. 185, 190 (1884). 
The doctrine, however, has not been limited to fraud situations. Circumstances that 
'will suspend or postpone the running of a statute of limitations include fraudulent con-
cealment, ~stoppel, waiver, absence of the defendant from the jurisdiction, disability (e.g., 
infancy, insanity, imprisonment) of the plaintiff, and the death of either party. See Deuel-
opments, supra note 8, at 1220-33. See also American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 
U.S. 538 (1974) (the filing of a class action later dismissed as improper was held to toll 
the statute of limitations with respect to a plaintiff who later filed the suit individually); 
Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424 (1965) (FELA action was begun in a state 
court having jurisdiction. The defendant was served with process but the case was dis-
missed for improper venue. The FELA time limitation was held tolled while the state suit 
pended and until the state court order dismissing the action became final). 
The use of tolling, which is said to be grounded in a "sound and philosophical view 
of the principles of [statutes] of limitations," Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 342, 
349 (1874), prevents the statute from running when the plaintiffs delay in properly insti-
tuting suit is justifiable. In addition, since the circumstances that justify tolling can be 
clearly explicated, the use of tolling maintains the certainty provided by statutes of 
limitations in determining when an action is barred. Consider this comparison of !aches 
and tolling: "The rules governing [tolling] are more clearly defined and are less flexibly 
applied than those governing !aches. . . . The defense of laches is directed more inti-
mately to the conscience of the chancellor, and whether it shall prevail rests in his discre-
tion." Gillons v. Shell Co. of Cal., 86 F.2d 600, 607 (9th Cir. 1936). 
It should also be noted that while state law determines the applicable limitation 
period in borrowing situations, federal law determines the circumstances that will toll the 
statute. Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 397 (1946); Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94, 
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Nevertheless, in Occidental Life the Supreme Court applied 
a laches standard to a situation where state statutes had formerly 
provided the time limitation. In so doing the Court discarded over 
eighty years of precedent requiring state borrowing and trans-
planted the equitable doctrine of laches into the alien realm of 
actions at law.112 Moreover, the change was not necessary. The 
Court could have held that a borrowed state statute oflimitations 
was tolled while the charge was processed through the EEOC's 
administrative machinery (as long as that period of time was not 
unreasonable).113 Alternatively, the Court could have followed the 
reasoning of its earlier decision in Johnson v. Railway Express 
Agency, Inc. 114 and advised the EEOC to file suit and "to request 
a stay until the administrative procedure is completed."115 Either 
approach would have protected not only the federal policy of 
informally resolving employment discrimination claims, but also 
the integrity of the limitation borrowing doctrine; and either 
approach would have been preferable to that adopted by the 
Court. 116 
103 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied., 394 U.S. 928 (1969). But see Johnson v. Railway 
Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 462-64 (1975). 
112. See text at notes 92-97 supra. 
113. See note 111 supra. 
114. 421 U.S. 454 (1975). 
115. 421 U.S. at 465. 
116. This is not to say that the Johnson approach of seeking a stay of the action 
pending administrative attempts to resolve the issue is as desirable as the tolling ap-
proach. 
The issue in Johnson was whether equitable tolling, discussed in note 111 supra, 
applies to Title VII and § 1981 actions. See note 4 supra. Although separate causes of 
action, they require the same factual allegations and the right to relief in each depends 
on the same findings. See Note, Employment Discrimination-Statute of Limitations 
Under Section 1981 Not Tolled by Filing of Charges with EEOC Under Title VIII, 1976 
Wis. L. REV. 288, 303. Before being allowed to sue under Title VII, however, a person is 
required to proceed through an administrative procedure within the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e-5 (f) (1) (1976). 
Acknowledging a congressional policy of encouraging the use of this procedure before 
suit, several courts had held that the filing of a Title VII charge tolled the statute of 
limitations for§ 1981. Guerra v. Manchester Terminal Corp., 498 F.2d 641, 648 (5th Cir. 
1974); Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 258 (5th Cir. 1974); Macklin 
v. Spector Freight Sys., Inc. 478 F.2d 979, 994 n.30 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Ripp v. Dobbs 
Houses, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 205, 214 (N.D. Ala. 1973). This had been done with the 
understanding that "the broad purposes of statutes of limitations . . . are not frustrated 
by [tolling]." Macklin v. Spector Freight Sys., Inc., 478 F.2d 979, 994 n.30 (D.C. Cir. 
1973). 
In Johnson, however, the Supreme Court held tolling inappropriate in equal employ-
ment actions. It did so because the Title VII cause of action that was filed was not "exactly 
the same" as the § 1981 cause of action later asserted. 421 U.S. at 467. 
On this issue, Justice Marshall's dissent provides a sounder analysis than that of the 
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In the future, Occidental Life should be limited to its facts. 
The Court's reasoning should apply only when federal pre-suit 
procedures, such as the EEOC's•conciliation process, are used to 
vindicate federal rights. For the moment, however, one is left with 
the Court's suggestion that any potential frustration of federal 
policy may require the application of laches rather than limita-
tion borrowing. It also remains to be seen whether any judicial 
belief that a state statute of limitations is too short117 will show 
"frustration of federal policy" sufficient to invoke the doctrine of 
Occidental Life. 118 
III. CONCLUSION 
The task of placing specific limitations on the prosecution of 
legal actions is a legislative function. 119 Perhaps the best resolu-
tion of today's confusion would be for Congress to enact a statute 
of limitations to govern all federal causes of action not otherwise 
limited.120 Since such congressional action appears unlikely, the 
majority. He argued that prohibiting tolling thwarts the congressional policy of providing 
multiple remedies, and that the purposes of statutes oflimitations would not be frustrated 
by allowing tolling in this situation. 421 U.S. at 472-73. In Johnson, the use of tolling 
would have been an appropriate, minor change in the federal limitations framework. Yet 
the Court relied on a mere technicality for its refusal to permit the practice. By contrast, 
in Occidental Life, the Court ignored technicalities, discarded precedent, and worked a 
much larger change with less justification than was present in Johnson. 
The facts of Occidental Life also raise the question of whether the holding only applies 
when a governmental agency such as the EEOC is suing. The Court did not indicate that 
this was an essential fact. Moreover, the Court had previously stated that a private 
litigant suing to enforce Title VII "vindicates important congressional policy" and that 
the private right of action remains "essential." Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 
36, 45 (1974). It would therefore seem anomalous to hold that a private litigant using the 
Title VII procedure should be barred when suing on his own right whereas that same suit 
would be permitted if prosecuted by the EEOC. This has not, however, proved to be a 
problem, since lower courts appear to be applying the Occidental Li{ e doctrine to suits 
by private litigants as well. See Kirk v. Rockwell Intl. Corp., 578 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1978); 
Wilson v. Continental Group, Inc., 451 F. Supp. 1 (M.D.N.C. 1978). 
117. Presumably, the government is interested in vindicating all policies expressed 
in congressional enactments. See Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 382-83 
(1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The question, however, is whether this justifies a court 
in adopting a limitation period longer than that specified by the analogous state law. 
118. Along similar lines, one might argue that a simple lack of uniformity would 
sufficiently frustrate federal policy. This view was rejected, however, in UAW v. Hoosier 
Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 703-04 (1966). 
119. See text at notes 26-36 supra. 
120. Several commentators have taken this position. E.g., Blume & George, 
/,imitations and the Federal Courts, 49 MtcH. L. REv. 937, 992-93 (1951); Note, supra note 
' 36, at 77-78; 32 MINN. L. REv. 65, 68 (1947); 49 YALE L.J. 738, 745 (1940). On a smaller 
scale such a statute already exists. 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (1976) limits actions for penalty or 
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problem of limiting these actions will probably remain with the 
courts. 
The options of recognizing causes of action without any limi-
tation and of judicially creating "statutes" of limitations are in-
appropriate. And since the inherently subjective nature of the 
doctrine of laches makes it ill-suited either to clarify or to im-
prove the federal limitations scheme, the Occidental Life ap-
proach of using !aches should not be favored. Moreover, when one 
considers that the use oflaches has been limited even in equitable 
actions, 121 it seems curious to consider expanding its use into legal 
actions, a domain to which it historically has not applied. This 
leaves the alternatives of borrowing either state or federal stat-
utes of limitations. Despite its drawbacks, there are several rea-
sons for preserving the pracfice of borrowing state statutes of 
limitations. It has been the traditional manner of handling the 
problem. Moreover, no category of state laws has been more con-
sistently held within the purview of the Rules of Decision Act 
than statutes of limitations.122 It is therefore reasonable t~ infer 
that, when Congress explicitly creates a right of action without 
also creating a limitation period, it intends to adopt the limita-
tion periods of the states. 123 That inference ought to be a presump-
tion for all congressionally created causes of action. 124 
forfeiture. This statute: however, has been construed narrowly. Meeker v. Lehigh Valley 
R.R., 236 U.S. 412 (1915). 
121. See text at note 91 supra. , 
122. Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610, 614 (1895); Bauserman v. Blunt, 147 U.S. 
647, 652 (1893). In cases concerning federal rights, the two principal areas historically 
covered by the Rules of Decision Act have been statutes of limitations and rules of evi-
dence. See Hill, supra note 36, at 77. The adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence has 
left only statutes of limitations. 
123. Hill, supra note 36, at 91. But cf. EEOC v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 511 F.2d 1352, 
1359-60 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 994 (1975), in which the court held that "in the 
absence of congressional intent to apply state statutes of limitations, such restrictions do 
not apply to the EEOC." The court did not explain why the traditional formula should 
be reversed in this case. 
124. As the Court has recognized, UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696,704 
(1966), if Congress disagrees with the specific application of the presumption, it can 
always act to overturn it. But see Bayles, supra note 36, at 652. Standing alone, the 
Hoosier Cardinal argument is weak since it can be easily applied to any judicial rule. But 
in this instance, against its historical background, it carries weight. 
Moreover, Congress has acted to add federal statutes of limitations where state stat-
utes had formerly been borrowed. For example, in response to the situation illustrated by 
Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610 (1895), see text at note 48 supra, Congress added a 
statute of limitations to limit patent claims, Act of March 3, 1897, ch. 391, § 6, 29 Stat. 
694 (current version at 35 U.S.C. § 286 (1976)). And in 1955 Congress added a limitation 
provision to the Clayton Act, Act of July 7, 1955, ch. 283, § 1, 69 Stat. 283 (current version 
at 15 U.S.C. § 15b (1976)). It has been suggested that these changes occurred only because 
fl 
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This reasoning, however, does not apply when the right of 
action has been implied by the courts rather than created by 
Congress. When Congress did not create the cause of action, it is 
impossible to infer that it intended to use the standard practice 
of borrowing state rules. Under such circumstances, a court may 
well borrow a specific federal statute of limitations that already 
applies to a similar federal right. If, however, the court deter-
mines that there exists no clear congressional limitations policy 
toward similar actions, it should conform to traditional practice 
and borrow a state statute.125 If Congress intends something dif-
ferent, it, not the judiciary, should say so. 
of the efforts of well organized patent and antitrust bars. Note, A Limitation on Actions 
for Deprivation of Federal Rights, 68 CotuM L. REv. 763, 773 (1968). If this is so, however, 
one wonders why rule l0b-5 still has no federal limitation. Surely the securities bar is no 
less organized than the antitrust bar. 
125. See text at notes 37-44 supra. 
